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I. INTRODUCTION 
  
 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, stating that 
people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects. It further requires that any search warrant be 
judicially sanctioned and supported by probable cause.1 Over the 
past few decades the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that many 
"searches" were not actually "searches"; therefore, they are not 
subject to the constitutional protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. Due to extensive advances in technology, there is 
increasing concern about privacy. This article will examine the 
relevant Supreme Court rulings that have protected and 
alternately restricted Fourth Amendment privacy rights, as well 
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II. OLMSTEAD v. UNITED STATES 
 
  Olmstead v. United States2 is one of the earliest cases in 
which the Supreme Court analyzed whether the use of new 
technology to obtain incriminating evidence violated a 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. In Olmstead, federal 
agents wiretapped private telephone conversations without 
judicial approval.3 This 1928 case concerned several petitioners 
who were convicted of conspiracy.4 The information that led to 
the discovery of the conspiracy was largely obtained by federal 
officers who were able to intercept messages on the conspirators' 
telephones. No laws were violated in installing the wiretapping 
equipment, as the officers did not trespass upon either the homes 
or the offices of the defendants; instead, the equipment was 
placed in the streets near the houses and in the basement of a 
large office building.5 The wiretapping went on for several 
months, and the records revealed significant details of the 
conspiracy.6  
 
 The majority opinion in Olmstead states that the Fourth 
Amendment, in part, intends to prevent the use of governmental 
force to search and seize an individual’s personal property and 
effects. "The amendment does not forbid what was done here. 
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was 
secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There 
was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."7 The 
opinion further suggests that because the wires that were tapped 
were not a part of either the petitioners’ houses or offices, they 
were not subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.8 
The majority concluded that there had been no official search 
and seizure of the person, his papers, or tangible material effects, 
and no actual physical invasion of property.9 Since there was no 
physical intrusion or seizure of private property, the Court ruled 
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that the wiretapping did not amount to a search or seizure within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.10  
 What makes Olmstead an important and often-quoted 
decision is not the opinion of the majority, but the famous 
dissent by Justice Louis Brandeis. Justice Brandeis attacks the 
majority's "trespass doctrine" and refusal to expand Fourth 
Amendment protections to telephone conversations.11 He states 
that when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, “force and 
violence” were the only means by which the government could 
compel self-incrimination.12 Thus, the protections offered were 
necessarily limited to address only imaginable forms of such 
force and violence.13 He further contends that, due to 
technological advances, the government can invade privacy in 
more subtle ways, and there is no reason to think that the rate of 
such technological advances will slow down. Brandeis found it 
unimaginable that the Constitution affords no protection against 
such invasions of individual security.14 
 
 Brandeis further argues that the protections guaranteed 
by the Fourth Amendment are broad in scope. The framers of 
the Constitution sought "to protect Americans in their beliefs, 
their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations."15 It is for 
this reason that they established, as against the government, the 
"right to be let alone" as "the most comprehensive of rights and 
the right most valued by civilized men."16 To protect that right, 
every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy 
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be 
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.17 Government 
officials must be subject to the same rules of conduct that we 
expect of every citizen. In his rousing dissent Justice Brandeis 
proved to be a visionary. Nearly forty years later, in its 1967 
landmark decision in Katz v. United States,18 the Supreme Court 
overruled Olmstead and similar decisions, and embraced 
Brandeis' view of protected privacy. 
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III. KATZ v. UNITED STATES 
 
 In Katz v. United States19 the defendant, Charles Katz, 
was involved in interstate gambling, which is illegal under 
federal law. To avoid detection and prison, he used public 
telephone booths to conduct his business.20 The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation became aware of his activities and moved 
quickly to collect evidence. The FBI identified the three phone 
booths Katz used on a regular basis and worked with the 
telephone company to take one out of service.21 The other booths 
were bugged, and agents were stationed outside Katz’s nearby 
apartment. Based upon the recorded conversations the FBI 
arrested Katz and charged him with an eight-count indictment.22 
 
 Katz's claim that the FBI’s surveillance of the phone 
booths was unconstitutional directly conflicted with decades of 
Supreme Court precedent, most notably Olmstead.23 Fortunately 
for Katz, he found a more receptive judiciary, and the Court's 7-
1 majority overturned the “trespass doctrine” that was 
established by the Court in Olmstead. The majority held that the 
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places” and is not 
dependent on intrusion into physical spaces. The Court also held 
that the Fourth Amendment applies to oral statements just as it 
does to tangible objects.  
 
. . . a person in a telephone booth may rely upon 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One 
who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and 
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is 
surely entitled to assume that the words he utters 
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the 
world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is 
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone 
has come to play in private communication.24 
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 In a separate concurrence, Justice John Marshall Harlan, 
Jr. fleshed out a test for identifying a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy,” one that is both subjectively understood by the 
individual and objectively recognized by society at large. He 
wrote: 
 
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.” The 
question, however, is what protection it affords 
to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to 
that question requires reference to a “place.” My 
understanding of the rule that has emerged from 
prior decisions is that there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person has exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” Thus, a 
man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where 
he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or 
statements that he exposes to the “plain view” of 
outsiders are not “protected” because no 
intention to keep them to himself has been 
exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the 
open would not be protected against being 
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under 
the circumstances would be unreasonable.25  
 
 Within a year, the Supreme Court started to use Justice 
Harlan’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test as the standard 
in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.26 Within a decade, 
Harlan’s test became so familiar that the Court officially 
recognized it as the essence of the Katz decision.27 While Katz 
expanded the Fourth Amendment protection against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” to cover electronic 
wiretaps, the long arm of Katz reaches into recent debates 
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over GPS tracking and mass data collection.29 Indeed, in an age 
of increasing digital technology, the principle that the Fourth 
Amendment “protects people, not places” is more 
consequential than ever. 
 
  
IV. UNITED STATES v. JONES 
 
 In United States v. Jones,30 decided in 2012, respondent 
Jones owned and operated a nightclub and came under suspicion 
of narcotics trafficking. Based on information gathered through 
various investigative techniques, police were granted a warrant 
authorizing use of a GPS tracking device on a Jeep of which 
Jones was the exclusive driver, however, the police failed to 
comply with the warrant’s deadline.31 Officials nevertheless 
installed the device on the undercarriage of the Jeep and used it 
to track the vehicle’s movements.32 By satellite, the device 
established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100 feet and 
communicated the location by cell phone to a government 
computer, relaying more than 2,000 pages of data over a 28-day 
period. The District Court suppressed the GPS data obtained 
while the vehicle was parked at Jones' residence, but held the 
remaining data was admissible because Jones had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy while the vehicle was on public streets.33 
The government obtained an indictment against Jones that 
included charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.34 
 
 Jones was ultimately convicted, but the D.C. Circuit 
Court reversed the conviction, holding the admission of 
evidence obtained by the warrantless use of the GPS device 
violated the Fourth Amendment.35 Upon review, the Supreme 
Court held unanimously that this was a "search" under the 
Fourth Amendment, although they were split as to the 
fundamental reasons behind that conclusion.36 Justice Antonin 
Scalia wrote the opinion for the majority, holding that by 
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physically installing the GPS device on the defendant's car, the 
police had committed a trespass against Jones' "personal 
effects" and this constituted a search.37 While he stated that 
Katz supplemented rather than replaced the trespassory test for 
whether a search has occurred, Scalia focused on trespass 
concerns versus the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
standard developed in Katz.38 Justice Scalia argued that the 
government’s physical intrusion on Jones’s car, a personal 
“effect”, would clearly be a search within the original meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment; the police had physically encroached 
on a protected area to gather information.39  
 
 Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Kagan, concurred in the judgment, but disagreed 
with the majority that any technical trespass that results in the 
gathering of evidence amounts to search, and asserted that the 
case should have been analyzed under the Katz standard.  
 
This case requires us to apply the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable 
searches and seizures to a 21st-century 
surveillance technique, the use of a Global 
Positioning System (GPS) device to monitor a 
vehicle’s movements for an extended period of 
time. Ironically, the Court has chosen to decide 
this case based on 18th-century tort law. By 
attaching a small GPS device to the underside of 
the vehicle that respondent drove, the law 
enforcement officers in this case engaged in 
conduct that might have provided grounds in 
1791 for a suit for trespass to chattels. And for 
this reason, the Court concludes, the installation 
and use of the GPS device constituted a search. 
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This holding, in my judgment, is unwise. It 
strains the language of the Fourth Amendment; it 
has little if any support in current Fourth 
Amendment case law; and it is highly artificial.  
 
I would analyze the question presented in this 
case by asking whether respondent’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy were violated by the 
long-term monitoring of the movements of the 
vehicle he drove.40  
 
 Justice Alito stated that because GPS technology is 
relatively easy and cheap, it overcomes traditional practical 
constraints on close surveillance and concluded that, in this case, 
its use violated society’s expectation that law enforcement 
would monitor all of an individual’s movements in his or her car 
for a 4-week period. While relatively short-term monitoring of 
an individual’s movements on public streets may be reasonable, 
“the use of longer-term GPS monitoring in investigations of 
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”41 
 
 While Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the Court's 
majority opinion and agreed that Katz supplemented rather than 
replaced the trespassory test for whether a search has occurred, 
she wrote a separate concurring opinion. She concurred with 
Justice Alito that most long-term GPS monitoring would 
violate Katz but noted that even short-term monitoring may 
violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
because of the unique nature of GPS surveillance.42 
  
 
V. THIRD PARY DOCTRINE 
 
 Advances in technology have also caused the Court to 
reexamine the "third-party" doctrine. Under this doctrine, 
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individuals have no constitutional right to privacy in information 
that others lawfully have; the government may search that data 
without a warrant or probable cause. The third-party doctrine 
largely traces its roots to United States v. Miller.43 In this 1976 
case, the government suspected Miller of tax evasion, and 
subpoenaed his banks, seeking several months of canceled 
checks, deposit slips, and monthly statements. The Court 
rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to the records collection 
on two grounds. For one, Miller could “assert neither ownership 
nor possession”44 of the documents; they were “business records 
of the banks.”45 For another, the nature of those records 
confirmed Miller’s limited expectation of privacy, because the 
checks were “not confidential communications but negotiable 
instruments to be used in commercial transactions,”46 and the 
bank statements contained information “exposed to [bank] 
employees in the ordinary course of business.”47 The Court 
concluded that Miller had taken a risk in revealing his affairs to 
a third party; therefore, that information could be conveyed by 
the third party to the government.  
 
 Three years later, in Smith v. Maryland,48 decided in 
1979, the Court applied the same principles in the context of 
information conveyed to a telephone company. In Smith, the 
telephone company, at police request, installed at its central 
offices a pen register to record all numbers dialed from the 
telephone located at the petitioner's home. The police did not get 
a warrant or court order before having the pen register installed. 
Since the pen register was installed on telephone company 
property, the petitioner could not claim that his "property" was 
invaded or that police intruded into a "constitutionally protected 
area." While there was no trespass, the petitioner claimed that 
the State infringed upon the "legitimate expectation of privacy" 
that he had in the telephone numbers he dialed from his home 
telephone.49  
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 The Supreme Court held that installing a pen register is 
not a search because the "petitioner voluntarily conveyed 
numerical information to the telephone company." Since 
the defendant had disclosed the dialed numbers to the telephone 
company so that it could connect his calls, his expectation of 
privacy regarding the numbers he dialed was not reasonable.50 
All telephone users realize that they must "convey" phone 
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone 
company switching equipment that their calls are completed. All 
subscribers also realize that the phone company has the ability 
to make permanent records of the numbers they dial, so this 
information cannot be considered private.51 As a result, the 
government is typically free to obtain such information from the 
third party without triggering Fourth Amendment protections.52 
The Smith decision left pen registers completely 
outside constitutional protection, and made it clear that if there 
were to be any privacy protection, it would have to be enacted 
by Congress as statutory law. 
 
 
VI. STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
 
 The Stored Communications Act53 of 1986 is a law that 
addresses voluntary and compelled disclosure of "stored wire 
and electronic communications and transactional records" held 
by third-party internet service providers (ISPs). Internet users 
generally entrust the security of online information to ISPs; 
therefore, many Fourth Amendment cases have held that users 
relinquish any expectation of privacy in this information. While 
the Fourth Amendment requires a search warrant and probable 
cause to search one's home,54 under the third-party doctrine only 
a subpoena and prior notice are needed to subject an ISP to 
disclose the contents of an email or of files stored on a server.55 
This is a much lower hurdle to overcome than probable cause. 
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) creates Fourth 
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Amendment-like privacy protection for email and other digital 
communications stored on the internet.56 It limits the ability of 
the government to compel an ISP to turn over content 
information and non-content information, such as logs and email 
envelope information.57 In addition, it limits the ability of 
commercial ISPs to reveal content information to 
nongovernment entities.58 
 
 The SCA targets two types of online service, "electronic 
communication services" and "remote computing services."59 
The statute defines an electronic communication service as "any 
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or 
receive wire or electronic communications."60 A remote 
computing service is defined as "the provision to the public of 
computer storage or processing services by means of an 
electronic communications system."61 With respect to the 
government's ability to compel disclosure, the most significant 
distinction made by the SCA is that communications held in 
electronic communications services require a search warrant and 
probable cause, and those in remote computing services only 
require a subpoena or court order, with prior notice.62 This 
distinction seems artificial and, due to historical and projected 
technological growth, Congressional legislative reform of the 
SCA appears necessary. The Supreme Court addressed this issue 
in its 2018 decision in the Carpenter case.63 
 
  
VII. CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES 
  
 In Carpenter v. United States,64 decided in 2018, several 
individuals conspired and participated in armed robberies over a 
four-month period. Four of the robbers were captured and 
arrested, and one of those arrested confessed and turned over his 
phone, allowing FBI agents to review the calls made from his 
phone at the time of the robberies. Soon after, a judge, in 
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accordance with the Stored Communications Act,65 granted the 
FBI's request to obtain "transactional records" from various 
wireless carriers for 16 different phone numbers for "[a]ll 
subscriber information, toll records and call detail records 
including listed and unlisted numbers dialed or otherwise 
transmitted to and from [the] target telephones . . . as well as cell 
site information for the target telephones at call origination and 
at call termination for incoming and outgoing calls[.]"66 The 
government obtained a court order before gaining access to the 
information; while they did not have probable cause for a search 
warrant, prosecutors only had to show that they were seeking 
evidence relevant to a criminal investigation.67 This was enough 
under the Stored Communications Act, which requires only "that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a 
wire or electronic communication, or the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation."68  
 
 Using this information, the government was able to 
determine that Carpenter was within a two-mile radius of four 
robberies.69 Carpenter was arrested, and a jury later convicted 
him on several counts of robbery, among other things.70 
Carpenter appealed and the Sixth Circuit, relying on the 
Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Maryland,71 affirmed, 
stating that only the content of a person's communication is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.72 The Court explained that 
"cell-site data, like mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP 
addresses, are information that facilitate personal 
communications, rather than part of the content of those 
communications themselves."73 Furthermore, the Court 
determined that the government did not obtain information from 
Carpenter, but the service provider's business records. 
Therefore, the government's collection of the service provider's 
business records did not constitute a "search" of Carpenter under 
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the Fourth Amendment, and a warrant was not required.74 
Carpenter appealed to the Supreme Court.  
 
 In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court reversed. Chief 
Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion for the majority, holding 
that the acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-site records was a Fourth 
Amendment search.75 When a phone connects to a cell site, it 
generates time-stamped cell-site location information (CSLI) 
that is stored by wireless carriers for business purposes. 
Historical cell-site records give the government near-perfect 
surveillance and allow it to travel back in time to retrace a 
person’s whereabouts. Roberts wrote that this sort of digital 
data, personal location information maintained by a third party, 
does not fit neatly under existing precedents. Instead, requests 
for cell-site records lie at the intersection of two lines of cases: 
those that address people’s expectation of privacy in their 
physical location and movements, and those that distinguish 
between what people keep to themselves and what they share 
with others, known as the third-party doctrine.76 
 
 Chief Justice Roberts declined to apply the premise of 
the Court's majority opinion in United States v. Jones,77 the GPS 
tracking case, which characterized the Fourth Amendment in 
terms of trespass upon property rights. Instead, he underscored 
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" concerns emphasized by 
five of the Justices in Jones.78 Roberts noted that, "Since GPS 
monitoring of a vehicle tracks 'every movement' a person makes 
in that vehicle, the concurring Justices concluded that 'longer 
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy'."79  
 
 Roberts then addressed the third-party doctrine, stating 
that at the time earlier cases about bank and phone records were 
decided,  
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. . .few could have imagined a society in which a 
phone goes wherever its owner goes, conveying 
to the wireless carrier not just dialed digits, but a 
detailed and comprehensive record of the 
person's movements. We decline to extend 
Smith80 (bank records) and Miller81 (phone 
records) to cover these novel circumstances.82  
 
Roberts noted that there is a “world of difference between the 
limited types of personal information” addressed in precedent 
and the “exhaustive chronicle of location information casually 
collected by wireless carriers.”83 Location data is not truly 
“shared” because cell phones are an indispensable, pervasive 
part of daily life and they log location data without any 
affirmative act by the user.84  
 
 Chief Justice Roberts noted that this decision is narrow 
and does not address conventional surveillance tools, such as 
security cameras, other business records that might reveal 
location information, or collection techniques involving foreign 
affairs or national security. In the end, he returned to Justice 
Brandeis' famous dissent in Olmstead,85 "[T]he Court is 
obligated, as '[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading 
privacy have become available to the Government' to ensure that 






 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, 
protecting one's personal information from public scrutiny. The 
Supreme Court in Olmstead87 held that if there was no physical 
intrusion or seizure of private property, there was no search or 
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seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.88 Justice 
Brandeis attacked the majority's "trespass doctrine" and their 
refusal to expand Fourth Amendment protections to telephone 
conversations, believing the Fourth Amendment guaranteed 
individuals "the right to be left alone." Nearly forty years later, 
in Katz v. United States,89 the Supreme Court overruled 
Olmstead and similar decisions, and embraced Brandeis' view of 
protected privacy.  
 
 Katz expanded the Fourth Amendment protection 
against “unreasonable searches and seizures” to cover electronic 
wiretaps.90 The majority held that the Fourth Amendment 
“protects people, not places”, is not dependent on intrusion into 
physical spaces, and applies to oral statements just as it does to 
tangible objects.91 In a separate concurrence, Justice Harlan set 
forth the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, which is now 
considered the essence of the Katz decision.92 
 
 In Jones93 the Supreme Court examined whether the 
admission of evidence obtained by the warrantless use of a GPS 
tracking device violated the Fourth Amendment. While the 
Court unanimously held that this was a "search" under the 
Fourth Amendment, they were split as to the reasons behind that 
conclusion.94 The majority returned to the old "trespass 
doctrine", holding that by physically installing the GPS device 
on the defendant's car, the police had committed 
a trespass against Jones' "personal effects" and this constituted a 
search.95 However, the four concurring Justices asserted that the 
case should have been analyzed under the "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" standard developed in Katz.96  
 
 In both Miller97 and Smith98 the Court applied the "third 
party" doctrine, stating that information voluntarily conveyed to 
a third party cannot be considered private.99 As a result, the 
government is typically free to obtain such information from the 
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third party without triggering Fourth Amendment protections.100 
While the third-party doctrine only requires a subpoena and 
prior notice to obtain information from a third party, the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA) creates Fourth Amendment-like 
privacy protection for email and other digital communications 
stored on the internet.101 However, the SCA does not provide this 
level of protection for communications held in remote 
computing services.102 The Supreme Court addressed this issue 
in Carpenter v. United States.103      
 
 In Carpenter the government did not have probable 
cause for a search warrant. However a judge, in accordance with 
the SCA, granted the FBI's request for a court order to obtain 
"transactional records" from various wireless carriers.104 The 
Court held that the acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-site records 
was a Fourth Amendment search and impinged on his 
"reasonable expectation of privacy."105 The Court distinguished 
the limited types of personal information addressed in precedent 
from the “exhaustive chronicle of location information casually 
collected by wireless carriers.”106 
 
 Our laws protect people from governmental intrusion in 
their daily lives. It has long been the task of the Supreme Court 
to balance the rights of individuals against the need of the 
government for information. This task has become exceedingly 
difficult due to technological advances as the progress of science 
has afforded law enforcement officials powerful new tools to 
carry out their important responsibilities. At the same time, these 
tools risk government encroachment of the sort that the Framers 
drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent. The Supreme Court's 
refusal in Carpenter107 to grant unrestricted access to a wireless 
carrier’s database of physical location information is vitally 
important for privacy protection amid such extraordinary and 
rapidly advancing technology. 
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